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Available online 24 March 2016The sense of agency refers to the feeling that we are in control of our actions and, through them, of events in the
outside world. Much research has focused on the importance of retrospectively matching predicted and actual
action outcomes for a strong sense of agency. Yet, recent studies have revealed that a metacognitive signal
about theﬂuency of action selection canprospectively informour sense of agency. Fluent, or easy, action selection
leads to a stronger sense of agency over action outcomes than dysﬂuent, or difﬁcult, selection. Since these studies
used subliminal priming tomanipulate action selection, it remained unclearwhether supraliminal stimuli affect-
ing action selection would have similar effects.
We used supraliminal ﬂankers to manipulate action selection in response to a central target. Experiment 1 re-
vealed that conﬂict in action selection, induced by incongruent ﬂankers and targets, led to reduced agency ratings
over an outcome that followed the participant's response, relative to neutral and congruent ﬂanking conditions.
Experiment 2 replicated this result, and extended it to free choice between alternative actions. Finally, Experi-
ment 3 varied the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between ﬂankers and target. Action selection performance
varied with SOA. Agency ratings were always lower in incongruent than congruent trials, and this effect did
not vary across SOAs. Sense of agency is inﬂuenced by a signal that tracks conﬂict in action selection, regardless
of the visibility of stimuli inducing conﬂict, and evenwhen the timing of the stimuli means that the conﬂict may
not affect performance.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).Keywords:
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Awareness1. Introduction
The sense of agency refers to the feeling that we voluntarily control
our actions and, through them, events in the outside world (Haggard &
Tsakiris, 2009). This involves establishing a link between our intentions
and our actions, and between our actions and their external outcomes. It
has been suggested that our experience of agency colours the back-
ground of our mental lives (Chambon, Sidarus, & Haggard, 2014b;
Gallagher, 2012; Haggard & Tsakiris, 2009), but we become especially
aware of it when the smooth ﬂow from intention to action to outcome
is disrupted.
Much research has focused on the second link, between actions and
outcomes. This has revealed an important signal that informs the sense
of agency - the comparison between expected and actual action out-
comes (Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2002; Wegner & Wheatley,
1999). If outcomes match our expectations, we feel that “I did that”;
while a mismatch signals a loss of agency. While mismatch signalling
partly relies on predictive processes, based on internal signals related. This is an open access article underto the action system (see Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008 for a re-
view of comparator models), it is essentially retrospective since the ac-
tion outcome must be known for the comparison to be made.
Recent studies have shown that ametacognitive signal about theﬂu-
ency of action selection also contributes to the sense of agency (see
Chambon et al., 2014b for a review). This signal serves to establish a
link between our intentions and our actions, and is available before
the action is evenmade, so it can informour sense of agency prospective-
ly. These studies used subliminal priming tomanipulate action selection
in an agency task (Chambon & Haggard, 2012; Chambon, Moore, &
Haggard, 2014c; Chambon, Wenke, Fleming, Prinz, & Haggard, 2013;
Sidarus, Chambon, & Haggard, 2013; Wenke, Fleming, & Haggard,
2010). Here, participants make left or right actions according to a target
arrow, which are followed by coloured circles – the action outcomes.
Participants are then asked to judge how much control they felt over
these circles. Unbeknownst to the subject, a small arrow – a prime – is
brieﬂy ﬂashed before the target. When the prime is congruent with
the target, and points in the same direction, action selection is easy;
butwhen the prime is incongruentwith the target, and points in the op-
posite direction, action selection is impaired, leading to slower reaction
times (RTs) and more errors (e.g. Wenke et al., 2010). Results showedthe CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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congruently primed actions, compared to incongruently primed actions.
Importantly, outcomes could not be predicted by the action or the
prime alone, but depended on the congruency between prime and tar-
get. Further, the effects of action selection on sense of agency could
not be explained by participants relying on a retrospective monitoring
of RTs, as these were not correlated with agency judgements. Tellingly,
a further experimentmanipulated the timing of stimuli to induce either
a normal priming effect or a “negative compatibility effect” (NCE; Eimer
& Schlaghecken, 1998). In theNCE, congruent primes impair rather than
facilitate motor performance. This manipulation reversed the effects of
primes on RTs, as expected, but judgements of agency were always
higher for congruent priming, in both normal and NCE priming
(Chambon & Haggard, 2012). The authors proposed a model in which
the very initial action intention, triggered by the prime, could be com-
pared with the executed action. Congruency between the initial inten-
tion and action would facilitate a metacognitive signal about action
selection, and thus lead to a higher sense of agency. The later motor in-
hibitory processes that caused NCE would occur downstream of this
metacognitive readout of initial intention.
Since these primes were subliminal, participants were not aware
that selection ﬂuency was manipulated, and could not strategically de-
cide to use ﬂuency as a cue to agency (Chambon & Haggard, 2012;
Wenke et al., 2010). Fluency can be thought of as a continuum between
easy, or ﬂuent, perceptual or cognitive processing, to effortful, or
dysﬂuent, processing (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009). Response conﬂict
is an instance of highly effortful processing (Botvinick & Braver, 2015).
Although the experience of selection ﬂuency/dysﬂuency may be rela-
tively weak, people may have a sense of “something going right/
wrong” in congruent or incongruent trials respectively, without being
able to identify why they have this feeling (Chambon et al., 2014b;
Pacherie, 2008). It has been shown that people can reliably introspect
on their experience of ease/difﬁculty in action selection, using a similar
subliminal priming task (Desender, Opstal, & den Bussche, 2014), as
well as with conﬂicting supraliminal stimuli (Morsella et al., 2009).
This feeling could then become associated with subsequent events,
such as action outcomes (Fritz & Dreisbach, 2013; Winkielman,
Ziembowicz, & Nowak, 2015). Interestingly, similar effects are found
when measuring agency at the end of a trial (e.g. Chambon &
Haggard, 2012) and at the end of a block (Wenke et al., 2010). This sug-
gests that the association between ﬂuency experiences and outcomes
could build up over time. Alternatively, the learning of action-outcome
relations may be disrupted by dysﬂuent action selection.
In fact, the studies that used subliminal priming tomanipulate selec-
tion ﬂuency (e.g. Chambon et al., 2013; Wenke et al., 2010) differ con-
siderably from previous research on the sense of agency, as they are
focused on the instrumental learning of the relation between speciﬁc ac-
tions and a number of possible outcomes (Chambon, Filevich, &
Haggard, 2014a). From this perspective, expertisewith a given environ-
ment leads to a growing sense of ease, or ﬂow, in selecting an action,
which becomes associated with more predictable outcomes. On the
other hand, research on the sense of agency has often focused on the at-
tribution of agency. In such studies, action-outcome associations are
often well known (Elsner et al., 2002), and may be violated (Kühn
et al., 2011), and/or there may be ambiguity about “who” caused a spe-
ciﬁc outcome, i.e. me vs. another agent (e.g.Wegner &Wheatley, 1999).
Response conﬂict induced by conscious stimuli has been shown to
lead to a reduced sense of agency over one's actions (Morsella et al.,
2009). However, it remains unclear whether conscious stimuli that in-
ﬂuence action selection might also alter the sense of agency over action
outcomes. One suggestive study set out to manipulate the visibility of
primes, while measuring judgements of agency over outcomes
(Damen, van Baaren, & Dijksterhuis, 2014). Participants were aware of
some primes, but not others. Prime words (“left” vs. “right”) were pre-
sented for a short or long duration, producing subliminal or supralimi-
nal priming, respectively. Participants freely chose whether to press aleft or right key once the following mask disappeared. Their action trig-
gered a high or low tone after a variable delay, and participants judged
their agency over the tone. For the subliminal priming condition, judge-
ments of agency followed the pattern previously reported, i.e. higher
ratings for trials in which the action was congruent with the prime, rel-
ative to prime-incongruent actions. However, for supraliminal primes,
the effects were reversed, and higher ratings were found for prime-
incongruent actions. The authors argued that awareness that one's
choice might have been biased by external input would reduce one's
sense of freedom and, in turn, one's sense of agency.
Importantly, Damen et al. (2014) study showed effects of priming on
the sense of agency, despite showing little or no effect of either sublim-
inal or supraliminal primes on reaction times. Priming of choices was
only found for supraliminal primes, in one of two experiments. Thus,
there is little evidence that primes inﬂuenced action selection processes
in their study. This contrasts with previous reports in which even sub-
liminal primes reliably biased free choices (Kiesel et al., 2006; Klapp &
Haas, 2005; Klapp & Hinkley, 2002; O'Connor & Neill, 2011;
Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2004; Wenke et al., 2010). Instead, Damen
et al. (2014) argued that action primes might inﬂuence agency judge-
ments independently of inﬂuencing action selection, by affecting
higher-order, conceptual representations of action and agency.
The present study aimed to clarify the contribution of action selec-
tion processes to sense of agency, using supraliminal stimuli to manip-
ulate action selection across 3 experiments. To additionally test the
generalisability of these effects, a novel task was used – the Eriksen
ﬂanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974). This is widely used to induce re-
sponse conﬂict, and assess cognitive control dynamics. The ﬂanker task
was adapted and combined with the design from the aforementioned
subliminal priming studies (Chambon & Haggard, 2012; Wenke et al.,
2010). Participants responded according to a target letter (e.g. left for
S, right for H), which could appear ﬂanked by congruent (e.g.
HHHHH) or incongruent ﬂankers (e.g. SSHSS). A coloured circle ap-
peared after a variable delay, and participants judged their control
over that colour. In the incongruent ﬂanker condition, the presence of
ﬂankers associated with the alternative action should lead to response
conﬂict, and thus an increase in RTs and errors.
Experiment 1 aimed primarily to test how supraliminal stimuli rele-
vant to action selection would affect the sense of agency in a situation
where each action could produce one of a number of outcomes.
Damen et al.'s results might suggest that the highest sense of agency
would be found in the incongruent condition, when participants had
to overcome conscious response conﬂict. However, if selection ﬂuency
has a general effect on the sense of agency then the highest sense of
agency should be found in the congruent ﬂanker condition. Additional-
ly, we included a neutral condition, with task-irrelevant ﬂankers (i.e.
OOHOO) to try to distinguish facilitation and conﬂict effects on action
(Kopp, Rist, & Mattler, 1996; Mansﬁeld, van der Molen, Falkenstein, &
van Boxtel, 2013; Taylor, 1977), and on the sense of agency. Finally,
some previous studies measured agency ratings at the end of each
trial, while others measured agency ratings at the end of a block. In
this study, we exploratorily tested half of the participants with each
method, though we did not have any strong prediction about interac-
tions involving rating method.
Importantly, free vs. instructed choice could modulate how aware-
ness of priming stimuli would inﬂuence the sense of agency. For sublim-
inal priming, having a higher or lower proportion of free choice trials,
relative to forced choice, did not interact with the effects of action selec-
tion on agency (Wenke et al., 2010). However, this may be different for
conscious priming. A participant who consciously perceives a prime
might recruit cognitive control resources to resist its inﬂuence, poten-
tially increasing their sense of agency. This possibility was assessed in
Experiment 2. Forced choice (i.e. instructed) trials were randomly
intermixed with free choice trials. A task-irrelevant target letter
indicated a free choice trial, and appeared surrounded by task-
relevant ﬂankers (e.g. HHOHH). Hence, actions could be congruent or
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central, attended stimulus, or was endogenously chosen.
Additionally, the timingof stimuli affecting action selection, and thus
response conﬂict, could be important. A sufﬁcient amount of time may
be needed between the appearance of biasing information and an
instruction/go-signal to develop a clear awareness that one is either fol-
lowing or going against that information. One might then come to have
a stronger sense of agency for overcoming external biases. Similarly, if
there is enough time, cognitive control processes can inhibit the auto-
matic motor activation induced by primes or ﬂankers, thus abolishing
their effects on motor performance (Flowers, 1990; Wascher,
Reinhard, Wauschkuhn, & Verleger, 1999). In this case, choosing to go
against the prime does not require any additional effort over choosing
to go with the prime. Nonetheless, awareness of an external suggestion
could still inﬂuence one's sense of agency.
To test the impact of the timing of conﬂicting stimuli, Experiment 3
parametrically varied the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between
ﬂankers and target. Flankers could precede the target by 500 ms
(−500 SOA) or 100 ms (−100 SOA), be simultaneous with the target
(0 SOA), or follow the target after 100 ms (+100 SOA). Maximal con-
gruency effects on performance are found for−100 and 0 SOA condi-
tions, but only small or no effects are found for the −500 and +100
SOA conditions (Eriksen & Schultz, 1979; Flowers, 1990; Taylor, 1977;
Wascher et al., 1999; Willemssen, Hoormann, Hohnsbein, &
Falkenstein, 2004). We hypothesized that the −500 SOA condition
would allow sufﬁcient time for suppression of the ﬂankers, and poten-
tially alter effects of conﬂict on sense of agency. The−100 SOA condi-
tion was expected to still show important effects on action selection,
but the clear precedence of the ﬂankers to the target might alter the
subjective experience of conﬂict and agency. The 0 SOA condition
should replicate our previous effects. In addition, the +100 SOA condi-
tionwould serve to assesswhether the temporal precedence of ﬂankers
or target might inﬂuence agency processing. If congruency between a
ﬁrst intention and the action performed is the important comparison
for agency, as suggested by Chambon and Haggard (2012), then this
condition should not affect agency even if it showed minor effects on
performance. Since choice did not interact with ﬂuency effects on agen-
cy in Experiment 2, only forced choice trials were used.
2. Experiment 1
2.1. Materials and methods
2.1.1. Participants
The study was approved by the UCL Research Ethics Committee.
Twenty-ﬁve participants (13 female, mean = 23.62, SD = 3.98) were
recruited, based on an a priori power calculation. For this, we used pre-
vious reports of prime compatibility on agency in ratings in operant
reaction-time tasks (Chambon et al., 2013), since no previous study to
our knowledge had investigated ﬂanker congruency effects on sense
of agency over action outcomes. With a Cohen's dz of 0.66 (Chambon
et al., 2013), power = 0.8, and alpha = 0.05, a minimum sample size
of 21 was indicated, but a slightly larger number were recruited, in an-
ticipation of possible attrition. Participants gave written informed con-
sent to participate in the study and received payment of £7.5/hour. All
were right-handed, with normal or corrected-to-normal vision, did
not suffer from colour blindness, and had no history of psychiatric or
neurological disorders. There were two groups of participants: odd-
numbered participants rated agency on every trial, while even-
numbered participants rated agency at the end of each block. One par-
ticipant in the block-wise rating group was excluded due to difﬁculties
in distinguishing outcome colours.
2.1.2. Apparatus and materials
Participants were seated approximately 50 cm from a computer
screen. The experiment was programmed and stimuli delivered withPsychophysics Toolbox v3 (Brainard, 1997; Kleiner, Brainard, & Pelli,
2007; Pelli, 1997), running on Matlab (MATLAB 8.1, The MathWorks
Inc., Natick, MA, 2013). During a trial, stimuli were presented in a
mono-spaced font, Lucida Console. A ﬁxation cross was presented in
18 point font size. Target letters consisted of S's or H's, while ﬂankers
consisted of S's, H's or O's. These were presented in 30 point font size,
with the 5 letter array subtending 3.2° visual angle. Participants
responded by pressing one of two keys on a keyboard. Outcome stimuli
consisted of a circle of 2.8° presented in one of 6 colours (red, blue,
green, yellow, orange and pink). Different colours were used in the
training phase.
All participants gave agency ratings on a 9-point Likert scale. The
trial-wise ratings group completed the rating procedure on the comput-
er. For the block-wise ratings, participantswere ﬁrst asked to rank order
the coloured circles (cut-outs) on a sheet of paper, and then gave a
Likert rating for each colour.
2.1.3. Design and procedure
The task involvedmaking actions in response to targets, whichwere
surrounded by distracting ﬂankers (see Fig. 1). The action triggered the
appearance of a coloured circle – the action outcome. Participants were
instructed to pay attention to the relation between their actions and the
outcomes that followed, as they were required to judge these relations
at the end of each trial or each block, for the respective group. Partici-
pants had to respondwith a left or right key press according to a central
target letter (S or H, respectively). The assignment of target letters to a
left or right actionwas counterbalanced across participants. Participants
were instructed to ignore the ﬂankers and focus on the central letter.
Flankers could be congruent with the central target – e.g. HHHHH, and
thus with the required action; incongruent – e.g. SSHSS; or neutral –
e.g. OOHOO (Matchock & Mordkoff, 2007; Taylor, 1977). Flanker-
target congruency was randomly varied across trials.
Outcome colours were dependent on both the congruency condition
and the action performed. Thus, each action (left vs. right) was associated
with three outcomes, one for each congruency condition (cf.Wenke et al.,
2010). The condition-to-colour mapping varied across the blocks, so par-
ticipants had to learn the action-outcome relations anew in each block,
and were informed of this. The six outcome colours were rotated in a
Latin square across the 6 blocks, and the blockmapping was randomised.
Each colour appeared once in each experimental condition, thus cancel-
ling out any idiosyncratic colour preferences. To ensure that the frequency
of each coloured outcome was equal despite differences in error rates
across ﬂanker-action congruency conditions, error trials were replaced
at the end of a block. Additionally, the action-outcome intervalwas varied
orthogonally to the congruency factor. This was not a variable of interest,
but served as a dummy variable, ensuring that participants were exposed
to a range of experiences, varying from low sense of agency (for delayed
outcomes) to high sense of agency (for less delayed outcomes; Haggard,
Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002; Wenke et al., 2010).
Participants were asked to judge how much control they felt over
the coloured circles that were triggered by their actions (Chambon &
Haggard, 2012; Wenke et al., 2010). For the trial-wise rating group, a
9-point Likert scale was presented at the end of each trial, where 1
was labelled “No Control” and 9 was labelled “Total Control”. The
block-wise ratings group completed a ranking and rating procedure
on a paper sheet at the end of each block. Participants were instructed
to rank order coloured circles on the sheet across 6 rankings, from
“Most Control” to “Least Control”. After ranking, participants gave a rat-
ing of their sense of control on the Likert scale described above.
The study started with a training block of 24 trials, to allow partici-
pants to get acquainted with the experiment and the agency ratings
procedure. Participants were given a chance to ask questions and repeat
the training if desired. To avoid colour mapping repetitions, different
colours were used during the training and experimental phases. At the
end of the study, participants completed a short debrieﬁng
questionnaire.
Fig. 1. Timeline of an example incongruent trial, for the trial-wise rating group. Participants responded according to a central target letter, surrounded by distractors. This triggered the
appearance of a coloured circle, after a variable delay. Participants gave agency ratings at the end of each trial, for the trial-wise rating group; or completed a ranking/rating procedure
at the end of each block, for the block-wise rating group.
Fig. 2. Results for Experiment 1. Panel a) shows the mean reaction times across ﬂanker-
action congruency conditions (collapsed across groups), and panel b) shows mean error
rates. Both facilitation and conﬂict effects can be seen in RTs and error rates. Yet, panel
c) reveals that mean agency ratings show only an effect of conﬂict, such that agency
ratings were signiﬁcantly reduced following incongruent relative to neutral and
congruent trials. Error bars show the within subjects 95% conﬁdence intervals for the
main effect of congruency. *p b 0.05, **p b 0.001.
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Each trial started with a ﬁxation cross presented for 500 ms. The
ﬂankers and target array appeared for 100 ms (Gratton, Coles, &
Donchin, 1992; Rodrı́guez-Fornells, Kurzbuch, & Münte, 2002). Partici-
pants responded to the target within a 1.2 s window. If the response
was correct, an outcome colour followed the response after a variable
delay of 100, 300 or 500 ms. Outcome duration was 300 ms. If an incor-
rect response or no response was given, a black cross was presented for
300ms. For the trial-wise rating group, the agency rating scale appeared
after 800 to 1200 ms, and remained on the screen until a response was
given. For both groups, the inter-trial interval varied randomly between
1 and 1.5 s. Each block consisted of 72 trials, and there were 6 blocks
overall. At the end of each block, the block-wise rating group completed
the ranking/rating procedure. All participants were allowed to take
short breaks between blocks.
2.1.5. Data analysis
For the block-wise ratings group, rating sheets were coded and the
data computerised. Any blocks where mistakes were made in the rank-
ing/rating procedure were excluded from analysis. Mistakes could in-
volve mismatches between the ranking and rating, or the repetition of
a colour name. This resulted in the exclusion of 1 block in 2 participants,
and 2 blocks in another participant.
Reaction times (RTs), error rates and agency ratings were submitted
to a 2 × 3 mixed-design analyses of variance (ANOVA). The between-
subjects factor was group: trial- or block- wise ratings group; and the
within-subjects factor was ﬂanker-action congruency: congruent, neu-
tral or incongruent. Planned comparisons were used to test differences
between congruency levels. For the block-wise ratings group, agency
ranks were submitted to a Friedman's non-parametric test to assess
the main effect of ﬂanker-action congruency. Wilcoxon pairwise tests
were used for planned comparisons.Within subjects 95% conﬁdence in-
tervals were obtained for the main effect of congruency (Loftus &
Masson, 1994).
2.2. Results
2.2.1. Action selection
Analyses of RTs showed a signiﬁcant effect of ﬂanker-action congru-
ency (F(2, 44) = 64.46, p b 0.001, ƞp2 = 0.75; see Fig. 2.a), but no effect of
group nor interaction (Fs b 1). Planned comparisons revealed that RTs
were signiﬁcantly slower (ps b 0.001) in the incongruent condition
(mean = 514.78, SD = 67.84) compared to the neutral (mean =
487.42, SD= 70.99) and congruent conditions (mean= 475.02, SD=
65.25). RTs were also signiﬁcantly slower in the neutral compared to
the congruent condition (p= 0.004; see Fig. 1).
Analyses of error rates revealed a signiﬁcant main effect of congru-
ency (F(2, 44) = 18.55, p b 0.001, ƞp2 = 0.46, Greenhouse-Geiser correc-
tion; see Fig. 2.b). Planned comparisons showed that participants made
signiﬁcantly more errors in the incongruent (mean = 9.82%, SD =
8.39%) compared to neutral (mean= 5.79%, SD= 5.65%; incongruent
vs. neutral: p = 0.001), and congruent conditions (mean = 4.29%,SD= 4.79%; incongruent vs. congruent: p b 0.001). The neutral condi-
tion also led to signiﬁcantly more errors than the congruent condition
(p= 0.017). Additionally, there was a signiﬁcant main effect of group
(F(1, 22) = 5.73, p = 0.026, ƞp2 = 0.21), as the trial-wise ratings group
made signiﬁcantly more errors than the block-wise ratings group. This
presumably reﬂects higher task difﬁculty for the trial-wise rating
group, as they had to give agency ratings in each trial, which meant
they had to press different keys. In contrast, the block-wise rating
group could focus exclusively on responding to the target, and could
keep their ﬁngers on the response keys throughout a block. Finally,
there was no signiﬁcant interaction between group and congruency
(F(1, 22) = 2.65, p = 0.10, ƞp2 = 0.11, Greenhouse-Geiser correction).
However, this result should be interpreted with particular caution, be-
cause our studymay not have had sufﬁcient statistical power to investi-
gate interactions involving between-subjects effects of group.
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The ANOVA on agency ratings revealed a signiﬁcant main effect of
congruency (F(2, 44) = 4.70, p=0.014, ƞp2 = 0.18; see Fig. 2.c). Planned
comparisons conﬁrmed that the incongruent condition (mean= 5.13,
SD=1.57) led to signiﬁcantly lower ratings compared to the congruent
(mean= 5.66, SD= 1.74; incongruent vs. congruent: p= 0.013), and
the neutral condition (mean=5.42, SD=1.63; incongruent vs. neutral:
p=0.039), whereas the congruent and neutral conditionswere not sig-
niﬁcantly different (p= 0.21). There was no signiﬁcant effect of group
(F(2, 44)= 1.29, p=0.29, ƞp2 = 0.013), nor a signiﬁcant group x congru-
ency interaction (F(1, 22) = 0.30, p= 0.59, ƞp2 = 0.055).
For the block-wise group, agency rankswere also analysed, and results
showed a signiﬁcant main effect of congruency (χ2 (2) = 8.73, p =
0.013). Planned comparisons replicated the pattern of results seen for
the agency ratings: the incongruent condition (median = 3.25, SD =
0.99) led to signiﬁcantly lower agency ranks than the congruent condition
(median= 4.00, SD= 0.66; incongruent vs. congruent: Z=−2.57, p=
0.010, r=−0.37), and the neutral condition (median=3.50, SD=0.50;
incongruent vs. neutral: Z =−2.27, p = 0.024, r =−0.33); whereas
therewas no signiﬁcant difference between congruent and neutral condi-
tions (Z=−0.99, p= 0.32, r=−0.14).
2.3. Discussion
Experiment 1 showed that ﬂanker-action congruency inﬂuenced ac-
tion selection as predicted. The sense of agency over action outcomes
was signiﬁcantly reduced following dysﬂuent action selection, com-
pared to ﬂuent selection. This replicates recent work demonstrating a
prospective contribution of action selection processes to the sense of
agency (Chambon & Haggard, 2012; Chambon et al., 2013; Sidarus
et al., 2013; Wenke et al., 2010), and generalises the ﬁnding across dif-
ferent behavioural tasks. So far,most studies used subliminal priming to
manipulate action selection (cf. Chambon et al., 2014b), or assessed
agency over the action (Morsella et al., 2009). To the best of our knowl-
edge, the present study is the ﬁrst to show a reduction in the sense of
agency over action outcomes following dysﬂuent action selection, even
though participants could consciously perceive the stimuli that inﬂu-
enced action selection.
Previous studies (Chambon & Haggard, 2012; Chambon et al., 2013;
Sidarus et al., 2013;Wenke et al., 2010) used subliminal priming toma-
nipulate action selection in order to preclude the explicit awareness that
one's action was manipulated. Additionally, this increased uncertainty
about the outcomes, since they were contingent on both the action
and the congruency between the (invisible) prime and the action.
That is, as the primes were not consciously perceived, the relation be-
tween prime-action congruency and speciﬁc outcomes could not be
represented, hence outcomes were never fully predictable. In contrast,
as participants were aware of the ﬂankers in the present study, they
could learn the full contingency schedule between the letter strings
and outcome colours. For example, in a given block, participants could
learn that the letter array “SSSSS”was followed by a green circle, where-
as “HHSHH” was followed by a red circle. Debrieﬁng conﬁrmed that
most participants were aware of this relation. Moreover, the causes of
difﬁculties in action selection, i.e. incongruent ﬂankers, were now clear-
ly available to participants. Nevertheless, the same effects of action se-
lection ﬂuency on agency ratings were found, irrespective of
perceptual awareness of the stimulus trigger.
Moreover, there was no signiﬁcant difference in the ﬂuency effects
on agency across the two rating procedures, i.e. trial- vs. block-wise rat-
ings. While the same effects had been shown using both procedures,
this was the ﬁrst study to combine them. Previous studies suggest that
action selection ﬂuency affects agency online (Chambon et al., 2014c;
Chambon et al., 2013). Additionally, the association between different
ﬂuency experiences and ensuing outcomes can be retained in memory,
at least for long enough to accumulate over the course of a blockof trials,
as seen here and in Wenke et al. (2010).The inclusion of a neutral condition allowed us to distinguish an en-
hanced sense of agency due to facilitation of action selection, from a re-
duction of agency due to response conﬂict. Only the effect of conﬂict in
action selection yielded a signiﬁcant modulation of agency ratings (see
Fig. 2). When ﬂankers were congruent with the central target, partici-
pantswere faster andmade less errors, thanwhen the ﬂankerswere neu-
tral. Additionally, incongruent ﬂankers led to signiﬁcantly slower RTs and
more errors, compared to neutralﬂankers. However,while agency ratings
were signiﬁcantly lower following incongruent ﬂankers, compared to
neutral and congruent ﬂankers, the trend for higher ratings following
congruent compared to neutral ﬂankers was not statistically signiﬁcant.
It should be noted that other baseline conditions, and different tasks,
could yield a different pattern of facilitation/conﬂict (Jonides & Mack,
1984). The present study used task-irrelevant stimuli as neutral
ﬂankers, which yielded both facilitation and conﬂict effects on perfor-
mance. As congruency effects on agency ratings are smaller than con-
gruency effects on RTs, the absence of a facilitation effect could result
from a lack of statistical power within-subjects. Additionally,
between-subjects design resulted in a small sample in each group, giv-
ing relatively low statistical power for investigating between-subjects
effects and interactions. These considerations mean that null between-
subjects effects should be interpreted with particular care. Importantly,
however, these between-subjects effects did not form the focus of our
predictions. The key predictions, and therefore the key results, come
from main effects of congruency on agency ratings. In our design,
these are based on within-subjects comparisons. Further, our results
are consistent with those obtained with the subliminal priming para-
digm (Chambon & Haggard, 2012). There, the reduction in agency rat-
ings following incongruent, compared to neutral primes, was larger
than the increase in ratings following congruent primes, though neither
was statistically signiﬁcant. A positive sense of agencymay be a “default
state” (Blakemore et al., 2002; Sidarus et al., 2013). Reduced agencymay
be triggered by disruptions in the intention-action-outcome chain,
which may produce a salient experience relevant to agency judgement
(Chambon et al., 2014b).
Our results contrast sharply with those of Damen et al. (2014). That
study reported higher agency ratings when participants chose an action
incongruentwith a supraliminal prime, compared to when they chose a
prime-congruent action. Importantly, free choice trials were used in
their study, whereas here participants had to follow the instruction of
a central ﬂanker. Experiment 2, therefore, investigated whether choice
may interact with the effects of ﬂanker congruency on sense of agency,
when biasing stimuli are consciously perceived. Free and forced choice
targetswere randomly intermixed, such that actions could be congruent
or incongruent with the ﬂankers, whether the action was instructed by
the central, attended stimulus, or was endogenously chosen.
3. Experiment 2
3.1. Materials and methods
3.1.1. Participants
Participant recruitment and study approval was as in Experiment 1.
Twenty-four participants were tested (13 female, mean= 21.50, SD=
3.02).
3.1.2. Design and procedure
Testing conditions and stimuliwere the same as in Experiment 1, ex-
cept that instead of a neutral ﬂanker condition, the letter O now served
as a neutral target in free choice trials. In free choice trials, the neutral
target was surrounded by ﬂankers associated with a left or right action.
For example, if the array “SSOSS” was presented, participants could
choosewhether to act congruently with the ﬂankers andmake a left ac-
tion, or act incongruently with the ﬂankers and choose a right action.
Thus, ﬂanker-action congruencywas not related to the stimuli, but rath-
er reﬂected the participants' action choice. In forced choice trials, the
Fig. 3.Results for Experiment 2. Panel a) shows themean reaction times for free and forced
choice trials, andﬂanker-action congruency conditions. Congruency effectswere larger for
forced choice trials, and RTs in incongruent trials were slower in forced choice conditions.
Panel b) shows the percentage of trials in which participants chose the action that was
congruent or incongruent with the ﬂankers in free choice trials, revealing a bias towards
ﬂanker-congruent choices. For forced choice trials, panel c) shows the mean errors rates
in ﬂanker-congruent or incongruent actions, with more errors being made in
incongruent trials. Finally, panel d) shows that, for mean agency ratings, there was only
a main effect of ﬂanker-action congruency, with lower ratings following ﬂanker-
incongruent actions, for both free and forced choice trials. Error bars show the pairwise
within subjects 95% conﬁdence intervals, calculated separately for free and forced choice
trials. *p b 0.05, **p b 0.001.
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1. The new 2 (choice: free vs. forced) × 2 (congruency: congruent vs. in-
congruent) design meant that 8 outcome colours were used, 4 associat-
ed with each hand, 1 per choice × congruency condition. The colours
were Latin square rotated across 8 blocks of 64 trials, and the
condition-colour block mappings were randomised.
All participants gave agency ratings at the end of each trial, thus the
trial timelinewas the same as the trial-wise group in Experiment 1. Only
2 action-outcome intervals were used (200 and 400 ms), to reduce the
overall number of conditions. As in Experiment 1, the study began with
a training block of 32 trials, and ended with a debrieﬁng questionnaire.
3.1.3. Data analysis
Reaction times were submitted to a 2 × 2 ANOVA, with choice (free
vs. forced) and ﬂanker-action congruency (congruent vs. incongruent)
as within-subjects factors. Agency ratings were submitted to a similar
ANOVA, with action-outcome interval (200 vs. 400ms) as an additional
within-subjects factor. For free choice trials, the proportion of ﬂanker
congruent choices was analysed with a one-sample t-test against a 0.5
chance level. For forced choice trials, error rates were analysed with a
paired-samples t-test comparing congruent and incongruent condi-
tions. Within subjects 95% conﬁdence intervals for pairwise compari-
sons were calculated separately for free and forced choice trials
(Pﬁster & Janczyk, 2013).
3.2. Results
3.2.1. Action selection
Analyses of RTs revealed no signiﬁcant main effect of choice (F(1,
23)=1.65, p=0.21,ƞp2=0.067), a signiﬁcantmain effect of congruency
(F(1, 23) = 20.76, p b 0.001, ƞp2 = 0.47; see Fig. 3.a), and a signiﬁcant
choice × congruency interaction (F(1,23) = 5.67, p = 0.026, ƞp2 =
0.20). Simple effects t-tests showed a signiﬁcant congruency effect for
forced choice trials, i.e. slower RTs for the incongruent (mean =
544.28, SD = 88.73) than the congruent condition (mean = 513.09,
SD=83.49), and a similar modest trend for free choice trials (free con-
gruent:mean=515.27, SD=88.85; free incongruent:mean=525.50,
SD = 96.85; one-tailed, free: t(23) = −1.72, p = 0.050, Cohen's
dz=−0.35; forced: t(23) =−4.68, p b 0.001, Cohen's dz=0.96). Addi-
tionally, incongruent trials led to signiﬁcantly slower RTs in forced com-
pared to free choice (t(23) = −2.18, p = 0.040, Cohen's dz = 0.44).
Choice did not affect RTs in congruent trials (t b 1).
In free choice trials, ﬂanker congruent choices were made in 57.47%
(SD= 5.72) of trials (see Fig. 3.c). A one sample t-test showed that the
proportion ofﬂanker-congruent choiceswas signiﬁcantly different from
chance (t(23)= 6.40, p b 0.001, Cohen's dz=1.31). For forced choice tri-
als, a paired samples t-test on error rates showed that the incongruent
condition (mean=19.33%, SD=11.73) led to signiﬁcantly more errors
than the congruent condition (mean = 14.85%, SD = 10.15;
t(23) =−4.39, p b 0.001, Cohen's dz =−0.90; see Fig. 3.b).
3.2.2. Agency ratings
An ANOVA on agency ratings revealed a signiﬁcant main effect of
congruency (F(1, 23) = 12.70, p = 0.002, ƞp2 = 0.36). Flanker-
incongruent actions (mean=6.25, SD= 1.07) led to lower agency rat-
ings than ﬂanker-congruent actions (mean= 5.80, SD= 1.23; see Fig.
3.d). Critically, there was no signiﬁcant main effect of choice (F(1,
23)=1.48, p=0.24,ƞp2=0.061), nor a signiﬁcant choice by congruency
interaction (F(1, 23) = 2.32, p= 0.14, ƞp2 = 0.092).
There was a marginal effect of action-outcome interval (F(1, 23) =
3.65, p = 0.069, ƞp2 = 0.14), such that ratings for the long interval
(400ms;mean=6.08, SD=1.10) were higher than for the short inter-
val (200 ms; mean = 6.01, SD = 1.12). These results are inconsistent
with previous ﬁndings using other tasks (Chambon & Haggard, 2012;
Chambon et al., 2014c; Haggard et al., 2002; Sidarus et al., 2013). In pre-
vious studies, using a wider range of intervals, higher ratings werefound for shorter intervals, recalling Hume's concept of temporal conti-
guity as a cue for causation (Hume, 1740). Importantly, action-outcome
interval did not interactwith the factors of interest – choice and congru-
ency (Fs b 1). Since action-outcome interval was not a factor of interest,
this factor will not be discussed further.
3.3. Discussion
Experiment 2 showed that action selection was inﬂuenced by
ﬂankers in both free and forced choice trials. Flankers biased choice,
such that participants were ~7%more likely to ‘freely’ select actions cor-
responding to the ﬂanker suggestion, compared to against it. Similar
biases have been found using subliminal priming (Mattler & Palmer,
2012; Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2004; Wenke et al., 2010). Flanker-
incongruent actions led to signiﬁcantly slower RTs in forced choice tri-
als, with a similar trend in free choice trials. Additionally, incongruent
forced choice trials led to signiﬁcantly slower RTs than incongruent
free choice trials. Hence, the cost on performance of freely choosing an
action incongruent with the ﬂankers was smaller than the cost of
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greater ﬂexibility for changes of mind has been shown for free, com-
pared to forced, choices (Fleming, Mars, Gladwin, & Haggard, 2009).
Crucially, response conﬂict, induced by supraliminal ﬂankers, signiﬁ-
cantly reduced the sense of agency over action outcomes for both
instructed and freely chosen actions.
Our results additionally show that the discrepancy between our
ﬁndings and those of Damen et al. (2014) cannot be explained by
whether participants could freely choose which action to perform, or
had to follow an instruction. Although null effects should be interpreted
with care, the absence of an interaction between choice and congruency
seen here is consistent with a previous subliminal priming study
(Wenke et al., 2010). In Wenke et al.'s (Wenke et al., 2010) study, free
and forced choice trials were intermixed, and free choices were effec-
tively biased by subliminal primes, similarly to our results. On the
other hand, Damen et al. (2014) found little effect of sub- or supralimi-
nal primes on choice, possibly due to the exclusive use of free choice tri-
als. This could have allowed participants to decidewhich action tomake
before the beginning of a trial, and thus before the primewas presented.
In fact, it has been shown that priming effects seen in blocks of
intermixed free and forced choice trials are abolished in blocks with
only free choice trials (Klapp & Haas, 2005; Schlaghecken & Eimer,
2004).
Nonetheless, Damen et al. (2014) did ﬁnd priming effects on agency.
The authors argued that the observed reduction in the sense of agency
when following a conscious prime could have been due to a reduced
sense of freedom. Using only free choice trials could have potentially in-
creased the overall sense of freedom experienced in the task, relative to
mixed conditions, rendering a reduction in that perceived freedom, due
to conscious biases,more salient. This sense of freedommay affect agen-
cy at a higher, conceptual level, and independently of action selection.
Another relevant difference between the two studies, which is relat-
ed to action selection, lies in stimulus timing. In Damen et al., the prime
preceded the go signal by 250ms in the supraliminal priming condition,
and there was no time limit for response. In contrast, in our study,
ﬂankers and targets were presented simultaneously, speed was
emphasised, and a tight responsewindowwas imposed. Hence, a ‘sufﬁ-
cient’ amount of time may be necessary for a realisation that one's ac-
tions are being biased, and thus override the normal relation between
selection ﬂuency and sense of agency. To assess whether the timing of
conﬂict stimuli may inﬂuence the sense of agency, the interval between
ﬂankers and target onset was parametrically varied in Experiment 3.
4. Experiment 3
4.1. Materials and methods
4.1.1. Participants
Participant recruitment and study approval was as in Experiments 1
& 2. Twenty-six participants were tested (13 female, mean age=23.08,
SD=3.63). One participant was excluded as she did not follow instruc-
tions, and sometimes used only one hand to press the left and right key.
4.1.2. Design and procedure
Testing conditions were the same as in Experiment 2, but with only
forced choice trials. Additionally, theﬂanker-target stimulus onset asyn-
chrony (SOA) was randomly varied across the trials. Flankers could ap-
pear: 500 ms before target onset (−500 SOA); 100 ms before target
onset (−100 SOA), simultaneously with the target (0 SOA); or 100 ms
after the target (+100 SOA). To accommodate the varying SOA condi-
tions, target duration was now set to 150 ms (Wascher et al., 1999).
Flankers were displayed until the target duration elapsed. Action-
outcome intervals were also changed to 100 and 500 ms to enhance
the discriminability of the 2 intervals, while keeping the experimental
session short.Each block included 4 outcome colours, one per action × congruency
condition, orthogonal to the ﬂanker-target SOA conditions. To obtain a
similar number of trials per SOA× congruency condition to the previous
experiments, 12 blocks of 64 trials were used. To ensure that each out-
come colour appeared only once for each action x congruency condition,
12 colours were used overall in the experiment. These were rotated
with a Latin square across the 12 blocks, in groups of 4, and the block
mappings were randomised. The 12 colours were shown to participants
at the beginning of the study to conﬁrm that they could reliably distin-
guish them. Participants were also instructed that the colours or the re-
lation between action and colours could change across blocks, so they
needed to learn them anew in each block. As in the previous experi-
ments, the study began with a training block of 32 trials, and ended
with a debrieﬁng questionnaire.
4.1.3. Data analysis
RTs and error rates were submitted to a 4 × 2 repeated measures
ANOVA with the factors ﬂanker-target SOA (−500, −100, 0, +100)
andﬂanker-action congruency (congruent vs. incongruent). Agency rat-
ings were submitted to a similar ANOVA that additionally included the
factor action-outcome interval (100 vs. 500 ms). Greenhouse-Geisser
corrections were used whenever the sphericity assumption was violat-
ed. Bonferroni adjusted post-hoc tests were used to probe the main ef-
fect of SOA. The SOA × congruency interactions were investigated with
paired samples t-tests,with a Bonferroni adjustment, to test congruency
effects across SOAs. Within subjects 95% conﬁdence intervals for the
pairwise differences between congruency conditions were calculated
separately for each SOA (Pﬁster & Janczyk, 2013).
4.2. Results
4.2.1. Action selection
Analyses of RTs revealed signiﬁcant main effects of SOA (F(3, 72) =
240.77, p b 0.001, ƞp2 = 0.91), and congruency (F(1, 24) = 60.40,
p b 0.001, ƞp2 = 0.72), and a signiﬁcant SOA × congruency interaction
(F(1, 24) = 9.28, p b 0.001, ƞp2 = 0.28). Post-hoc tests to explore the
main effect of SOA showed that all pairwise comparisons between
SOAs were signiﬁcant (ps b 0.001). As Fig. 4.a shows, RTs were faster
with earlier presentation of the ﬂankers. Probing the
SOA × congruency interaction revealed signiﬁcant congruency effects
at each SOA (ps b 0.001), except at −500 SOA (t(1, 24) = −1.04,
p = 0.31, Cohen’s dz =−0.21).
Analyses of error rates showed no signiﬁcant effect of SOA (F(1, 24)=
1.08, p= 0.36, ƞp2 = 0.04), a signiﬁcant main effect of congruency (F(1,
24) = 31.61, p b 0.001, ƞp2 = 0.57), and a signiﬁcant SOA × congruency
interaction (F(1, 24) = 5.01, p = 0.003, ƞp2 = 0.17). Post hoc tests re-
vealed signiﬁcant congruency effects for −100 and 0 SOA (−100
SOA: t(1, 24) = −5.08, p b 0.001, Cohen's dz = −1.02; 0 SOA: t(1,
24) = −3.54, p = 0.002, Cohen's dz = 0.71), but not for −500 or
+100 SOA (−500: t(1, 24) =−0.39, p = 0.70, Cohen's dz =−0.078;
+100: t(1, 24) =−1.58, p= 0.13, Cohen's dz =−0.32; see Fig. 4.b).
4.2.2. Agency ratings
Analyses of agency ratings revealed a marginal main effect of con-
gruency (F(1, 24) = 3.99, p= 0.057, ƞp2 = 0.14), in the predicted direc-
tion: incongruent ﬂankers (mean = 6.42, SD = 1.57) led to lower
ratings compared to congruent ﬂankers (mean= 6.67, SD= 1.47; see
Fig. 4.c). Notably, there was no main effect of SOA (F(3, 72) = 0.87,
p=0.46, ƞp2 = 0.035), and no interaction between SOA and congruency
(F(3, 72) = 0.40, p = 0.75, ƞp2 = 0.017). The absence of SOA effects on
agency ratings can be clearly observed in Fig. 4.c.
Finally, there was a trend towards a main effect of action-outcome
interval (F(1, 24) = 3.27, p = 0.083, ƞp2 = 0.12), with long intervals
(500 ms; mean = 6.57, SD = 1.47) leading to higher agency ratings
than short intervals (100 ms; mean = 6.53, SD = 1.50). There was
also a marginal interaction between congruency and action-outcome
Fig. 4. Results for Experiment 3. Panel a) showsmean reaction times across ﬂanker-target
stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs), and ﬂanker-action congruency conditions. There
were congruency effects at all SOAs except−500 ms. On panel b) the mean error rates
per condition are shown, with larger congruency effects at −100 and 0 SOAs. Finally,
panel c) depicts the mean agency ratings across conditions, and only reveals a main
effect of congruency, with incongruent trials leading to lower ratings than congruent
trials, regardless of ﬂanker-target SOA. Error bars show the within subjects 95%
conﬁdence intervals for the congruency pairwise differences, for each SOA. * - p b 0.05,
** - p b 0.001.
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prediction, and so was not explored further. The remaining interactions
were not signiﬁcant (ps N 0.18). Both action-outcome interval results
are inconsistent with previous priming studies (Chambon & Haggard,
2012; Chambon et al., 2014c; Sidarus et al., 2013). Even though the dif-
ference between the two intervals was increased, relative to Exp. 2,
varying the ﬂanker-target SOA may have changed the perception of
the subsequent action-outcome interval, and disrupted its normal ef-
fects on agency. Since action-outcome interval was not a manipulation
of interest, this will not be discussed further.
4.3. Discussion
Results showed that ﬂanker effects on action selection were modu-
lated by the ﬂanker-target SOA. As predicted, ﬂankers had no effect on
action selection at−500 SOA, but incongruent ﬂankers did lead to per-
formance costs with the other SOAs (see Fig. 4.a and 4.b). Additionally,
there was a gradual increase in RTs with increasing SOA, possibly due
to an alerting effect of early ﬂankers, also found in previous studies
(Flowers, 1990; Taylor, 1977; Wascher et al., 1999; Willemssen et al.,
2004). Critically, there was no signiﬁcant interaction between ﬂanker-
target SOA and congruency on agency ratings. That is, incongruent con-
ditions led to (marginally) lower agency ratings than congruentconditions, but did so similarly across ﬂanker-target SOAs (see Fig.
4.c), including SOAs where ﬂankers had no performance effects.
These results are inconsistent with the hypothesis outlined above of
an interaction between the timingof conﬂict during action selection and
the direction of ﬂuency effects on agency. That hypothesis suggested
that SOAs favouring successful inhibitory cognitive control might lead
to higher agency ratings for incongruent, rather than congruent
ﬂankers. At−500 SOA, we found efﬁcient inhibitory cognitive control,
resulting in no congruency effect on RTs or error rates, yet sense of agen-
cy was still higher for congruent than incongruent trials. Therefore, the
results of Damen et al. (2014) cannot be explained by a longer time
delay between a biasing inﬂuence and action allowing the recruitment
of cognitive control to efﬁciently overcome those biases.
The dissociation seen here between congruency effects on motor
performance and on agency ratings is, however, consistent with
Damen et al. (2014), where priming inﬂuenced agency but not action
selection. The authors argued that the effects were independent of se-
lection ﬂuency, but rather due to priming of conceptual representations
of action, or to inﬂuencing the experience of freedom. A dissociation be-
tweenmotor effects and agency was also found in a subliminal priming
study, using NCE priming (Chambon & Haggard, 2012). It was proposed
that congruency between an initial prime's suggestion and the executed
action could serve as a ﬂuency signal that would increase the sense of
agency.
However, neither of these proposals can fully account for our results,
since they would predict that only congruency between the ﬁrst inten-
tion and the action shouldmatter. Our results show that the appearance
of incongruent ﬂankers 100ms after the target still affected the sense of
agency, even though the action performed remained congruent with
the ﬁrst intention, which was presumably triggered by the target.
Therefore, it seems that holding conﬂicting intentions is key for the ob-
served reduction in the sense of agency, rather than the precise dynam-
ics of the selection process. Importantly, this condition still led to
congruency effects on motor performance, consistent with earlier re-
ports (Eriksen & Schultz, 1979; Taylor, 1977). Action selection processes
take time, and will be susceptible to disruptions occurring within a
given time window. When using arrow stimuli in the ﬂanker task, no
performance effects were found with a + 100 SOA (Wascher et al.,
1999). Thus, the window in which action selection can be disrupted
may vary depending on whether the stimulus is imperative in nature.
Our results are compatible with a view of the sense of agency as
resulting from an integration of information about conﬂict over a
wider time-window than the time-window of action selection. It has
been argued that ﬂuency/conﬂict signals are relatively non-speciﬁc
with respect to their sources, and have only a general inﬂuence
(Winkielman et al., 2015). The temporal sensitivity of such signals,
and of their integration in the sense of agency, may be low relative to
the precise temporal dynamics of action selection and execution. To bet-
ter characterise this window of temporal integration, future studies
could include more ﬂanker-target asynchrony values. In particular,
onemight askwhether ﬂankers continue to inﬂuence the sense of agen-
cy even when presented so late that they no longer inﬂuence reaction
times.
5. General discussion
Overall, our results suggest that the sense of agency over an action
outcome is informedby cognitive processes occurringprior to action ex-
ecution, particularly those processes involved in initiating a correct
rather than an inappropriate action. In many situations, action control
requires identifying an appropriate target, and then selecting and initi-
ating the corresponding action, while avoiding the inﬂuence of
distractors. The feeling of control over the consequences of action is in-
ﬂuence by these processes. Part of the content of agency judgements ap-
pears to derive frommonitoring processes that detect response conﬂict
during action selection.
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speciﬁc dynamics of conﬂict at the level of motor performance. Thus,
the prospective, premotor signals that inﬂuence sense of agency appear
to signal a disruption in action selection whenever conﬂict emerges, re-
gardless of whether the conﬂict is successfully resolved, and of how per-
formance is affected (cf. Chambon & Haggard, 2012). Additionally, this
putativemonitoring system can integrate information about action selec-
tion in a timewindow that is broader than thatwhich affects selection at a
motor level.Moreover, the effects of action selection on the sense of agen-
cy can be independent of the effects of choice, and of the effects of being
aware of inﬂuences on one's action or choice. That is, regardless ofwheth-
er we have a choice in what to do, and whether we are aware of stimuli
that could bias our decisions, dysﬂuent or difﬁcult action selection can
lead to a reduction in our sense of agency over action outcomes. Finally,
we have shown that these effects generalise across tasks.
Our results imply that the sense of agency depends on some internal
signal related to selecting between alternative actions. In that regard,
our results are compatible with ‘metacognitive’ theories of agency
(Metcalfe & Greene, 2007). Where might these internal signals be
found within the motor system? The supplementary motor area
(SMA) is necessary for triggering the automatic inhibition processes
thought to underlie NCE priming, whereas upstream regions such as
the pre-SMA are not (Sumner et al., 2007). Such automatic inhibition
processes were not found to disrupt the sense of agency (Chambon &
Haggard, 2012). The pre-SMAhas in turn been implicated inmonitoring
response conﬂict, elicited both by conscious and unconscious stimuli
(vanGaal, Scholte, Lamme, Fahrenfort, & Ridderinkhof, 2010). Relatedly,
the premotor cortex, but not the primarymotor area, has been shown to
contribute to metacognitive judgements of perceptual conﬁdence
(Fleming et al., 2014). More speciﬁc to the present ﬁndings, an fMRI
study (Chambon et al., 2013) used the subliminal priming paradigm to
study congruency effects on the sense of agency. This study showed
that the dorsolateral pre-frontal cortex was sensitive to response con-
ﬂict, and was associatedwith the angular gyrus, wherein higher activity
was linked to a greater reduction in agency ratings. Together, these
studies suggest that the metacognitive monitoring of action selection
that informs the sense of agency,may rely on higher-order action repre-
sentations in premotor and prefrontal areas, rather than low-level
motor signals in the primary motor cortex.
Importantly, the congruency effects on agency seen here are not due
to a retrospective inferential process, but rely on prospective signals
from action monitoring processes. As the ﬂankers were clearly visible,
one might be tempted to think that the observed effects could result
from a retrospective comparison between the ﬂankers and the target,
or action, namely at a conceptual level. However, this would imply
that neutral ﬂankers would lead to a loss of agency, as they were visibly
different from the target. Instead, the effects seen here appear speciﬁcal-
ly related to conﬂict in action selection. Experiment 1 showed no signif-
icant difference between congruent and neutral ﬂankers, but only a
signiﬁcant reduction in agency following incongruent ﬂankers. Al-
though such null effects should be interpreted with care, especially
due to potentially low statistical power, they suggest that a perceptual
or conceptual mismatch may not be sufﬁcient to explain our results.
Rather, an incongruent action plan should be triggered at some stage,
for a reduced sense of agency. In fact, subliminal priming was used in
previous studies to manipulate action selection but preclude such
post-hoc, conceptual inferences. This method showed a consistent
trend for a larger cost of conﬂict on agency ratings than a facilitation ef-
fect (Chambon & Haggard, 2012). Our Experiment 3 is also consistent
with a prospective account: the presence of conﬂictingmotor plans dur-
ing the trial led to a loss of agency, even when the interval between
ﬂankers and target was sufﬁcient to resolve the conﬂict. The subjective
experience of conﬂict may linger, even after themotor conﬂict has been
resolved. Conﬂict signals are especially motivationally signiﬁcant since
they can indicate a need to adjust subsequent behaviour (Botvinick &
Braver, 2015; Holroyd & Yeung, 2012). As such, theymay have a greaterimpact on the sense of agency than ﬂuency experiences. Additionally, a
positive sense of agency may be a ‘default’, and thus we are especially
sensitive to disruptions to the normal ﬂow of voluntary action
(Chambon et al., 2014b).
Our results clearly contrast with some reports that effort or difﬁculty
can enhance sense of agency (cf. Damen et al., 2014;Demanet, De Baene,
Arrington, & Brass, 2013). Why, then, do effort and conﬂict sometimes
increase sense of agency, and sometimes reduce it? The relation be-
tween ﬂuency or effort and the sense of agency is complex and remains
poorly understood (Nahmias, 2005; Pacherie, 2008). Oftenwhen inten-
tional actions unfold without any obstacles, the sense of ﬂuency can re-
sult in a strong sense of agency, as “everything went according to plan”.
Yet, effort can also enhance the sense of agency.When a need for cogni-
tive control can be anticipated, some proactive conﬂict processing
(Braver, 2012) may become part of the action plan. This may highlight
the sense of self, and of being engaged with task at hand. In contrast,
when disruptions are unexpected, executive control will be triggered
reactively by conﬂict signals. We speculate that these two sources of
cognitive control may have different effects on sense of agency. In par-
ticular, proactively embedding effort into the action planmay be associ-
ated with an increase in the sense of agency (I knew it would be tricky,
but I managed it), however, the unexpected or unwanted need for
added effort could instead lead to a reduction in our sense of agency
(suddenly I had to deal with all these things).
In addition, the context or the framing of a task couldmodulate how
conﬂict inﬂuences agency. In Damen et al.'s study, each action triggered
a speciﬁc outcome (a beep with a given pitch) after a variable delay (0–
600ms). Participants were instructed that sometimes theywould cause
the beep to occur (the outcome), but other times it would be caused by
the computer. Thus, the task and the agency question were framed in
terms of attributing the cause of the outcome to the self, or to another.
Also, subliminal and supraliminal priming were randomised, so partici-
pants presumably experienced wide variations in degree of inﬂuence
from the primes. In contrast, our studies focused on the instrumental as-
pect of agency, as participantswere asked to judge the strength of the re-
lation between various actions and outcomes, rather than invoking
alternative agents. That is, our study focused on ‘concomitant variation’
between a single agent's different instrumental actions and their out-
comes, rather than on attribution of outcomes to agents. Both processes
are relevant to agency, but conﬂict between alternative actions might
have different effects on each of them. Further research is needed to
clarify the conditions under which conﬂict can enhance, rather than re-
duce, the sense of agency.
Our results are consistent with previous proposals that the sense of
agency integrates information from multiple sources (Synofzik et al.,
2008), and over time (Chambon et al., 2014b; Farrer, Valentin, &
Hupé, 2013). In addition to retrospective processes related to outcome
monitoring, there is also a prospective component related to action se-
lection (see Fig. 5). Action selection monitoring can detect conﬂicting
intentions and prospectively signal a loss of agency. After this, outcome
monitoring can assess action outcome intervals and outcome identity
for a mismatch with predictions or expectations, and retrospectively
signal a loss of agency. If the smooth ﬂow between intention – action
– outcome remains unperturbed, the sense of agency can remain at a
default level. Additionally, higher-order beliefs and contextual informa-
tion can also inﬂuence the sense of agency (Moore & Fletcher, 2012;
Synofzik et al., 2008). We found that choice, awareness of biases and
timing of conﬂict did not interact with the effects of selection ﬂuency.
However, they may make independent contributions to the sense of
agency, depending on context, or other cues.
6. Conclusion
Across the experiments reported here, the sense of agency was pro-
spectively informed by monitoring the processes of action selection.
When conﬂicting intentions were present, the sense of agency over
Fig. 5. Prospective and retrospective contributions to the sense of agency. The sense of
agency is prospectively informed by monitoring action selection. When this action
monitoring system detects an intention that conﬂicts with the to-be-executed intention,
it sends a signal indicating a loss of agency. Once the action outcome is known, this can
be compared with a prediction of the outcome, based on the executed action. When
there is a mismatch between the predicted and actual outcomes, an outcome
monitoring system can retrospectively signal a loss of agency. If the normal ﬂow from
intention, to action, to outcome is disrupted, the sense of agency is reduced.
10 N. Sidarus, P. Haggard / Acta Psychologica 166 (2016) 1–11action outcomes was reduced. The effect of conﬂict on the sense of
agency was independent of awareness of the causes of conﬂict, of free
vs. instructed action selection, and of the timing of conﬂicting informa-
tion during action selection. Finally, these effects generalised across
tasks, from subliminal priming of actions, to the Eriksen ﬂanker task,
thus revealing a new approach for further investigating prospective
contributions to the sense of agency.
These ﬁndings support the view that the sense of agency is especially
sensitive to a disruption in the normal ﬂow of intentional action, from an
intention or goal to its corresponding action, to the desired/expected con-
sequences (Chambon et al., 2014b; Haggard & Chambon, 2012). Impor-
tantly, ﬂuency of action selection was independent of the actual
statistical contingency between actions and outcomes in these experi-
ments. Selection ﬂuency does not guarantee successful agency: one can
know exactly what to do, and still fail to produce an intended outcome.
However, selection ﬂuency may serve as a useful heuristic to guide our
sense of agency, as it often predicts successful outcomes (Haggard &
Chambon, 2012). Prospective agency processes based on action selection
may thus help to bridge the time gap between action and outcome.
Acknowledgements
NS was supported by UCL Impact Scholarship and the Belgian Sci-
ence Policy Ofﬁce project “Mechanisms of conscious and unconscious
learning” (IAP P7/33). PH was supported by an ESRC Professorial Fel-
lowship, an ESRC/ESF ECRP Research Project, by ERC Advanced Grant
HUMVOL, and by EU FP7 Project VERE, Work Package 1. We also wish
to thankHun Choi and Ksenia Vinogradova for helpwith data collection.
References
Alter, A. L., & Oppenheimer, D. M. (2009). Uniting the tribes of ﬂuency to form a
metacognitive nation. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 13(3), 219.
Blakemore, S. J., Wolpert, D. M., & Frith, C. D. (2002). Abnormalities in the awareness of
action. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 6(6), 237–242. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1364-
6613(02)01907-1.
Botvinick, M. M., & Braver, T. (2015). Motivation and cognitive control: From behavior to
neural mechanism. Annual Review of Psychology, 66(1), 83–113. http://dx.doi.org/10.
1146/annurev-psych-010814-015044.
Brainard, D. H. (1997). The psychophysics toolbox. Spatial Vision, 10(4), 433–436.
Braver, T. S. (2012). The variable nature of cognitive control: A dual mechanisms frame-
work. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 16(2), 106–113. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.
2011.12.010.
Chambon, V., & Haggard, P. (2012). Sense of control depends on ﬂuency of action selection,
not motor performance. . http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2012.07.011 Cognition.
Chambon, V., Moore, J. W., & Haggard, P. (2014c). TMS stimulation over the inferior pari-
etal cortex disrupts prospective sense of agency. Brain Structure and Function, 1–13.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00429-014-0878-6.Chambon, V., Sidarus, N., & Haggard, P. (2014b). From action intentions to action effects:
How does the sense of agency come about? Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 8, 320.
http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2014.00320.
Chambon, V., Filevich, E., & Haggard, P. (2014a). What is the human sense of agency, and
is it metacognitive? In S. M. Fleming, & C. D. Frith (Eds.), The cognitive neuroscience of
metacognition (pp. 321–342). Berlin Heidelberg: Springer Retrieved from http://link.
springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-45190-4_14
Chambon, V., Wenke, D., Fleming, S. M., Prinz, W., & Haggard, P. (2013). An online neural
substrate for sense of agency. Cerebral Cortex, 23(5), 1031–1037. http://dx.doi.org/10.
1093/cercor/bhs059.
Damen, T. G. E., van Baaren, R. B., & Dijksterhuis, A. (2014). You should read this! Perceiv-
ing and acting upon action primes inﬂuences one's sense of agency. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 50, 21–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2013.09.
003.
Demanet, J., De Baene, W., Arrington, C. M., & Brass, M. (2013). Biasing free choices: The
role of the rostral cingulate zone in intentional control NeuroImage . http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2013.01.052.
Desender, K., Opstal, F. V., & den Bussche, E. V. (2014). Feeling the conﬂict the crucial role
of conﬂict experience in adaptation. Psychological Science, 25(3), 675–683. http://dx.
doi.org/10.1177/0956797613511468.
Eimer, M., & Schlaghecken, F. (1998). Effects of masked stimuli on motor activation: Be-
havioral and electrophysiological evidence. Journal of Experimental Psychology,
Human Perception and Performance, 24(6), 1737–1747.
Elsner, B., Hommel, B., Mentschel, C., Drzezga, A., Prinz, W., Conrad, B., & Siebner, H.
(2002). Linking actions and their perceivable consequences in the human brain.
NeuroImage, 17(1), 364–372. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/nimg.2002.1162.
Eriksen, B. A., & Eriksen, C. W. (1974). Effects of noise letters upon the identiﬁcation of a
target letter in a nonsearch task. Perception & Psychophysics, 16(1), 143–149. http://
dx.doi.org/10.3758/BF03203267.
Eriksen, C. W., & Schultz, D. W. (1979). Information processing in visual search: A contin-
uous ﬂow conception and experimental results. Perception & Psychophysics, 25(4),
249–263. http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/BF03198804.
Farrer, C., Valentin, G., & Hupé, J. M. (2013). The time windows of the sense of agency.
Consciousness and Cognition, 22(4), 1431–1441. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.
2013.09.010.
Fleming, S. M., Maniscalco, B., Ko, Y., Amendi, N., Ro, T., & Lau, H. (2014). Action-speciﬁc
disruption of perceptual conﬁdence. Psychological Science, 0956797614557697.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797614557697.
Fleming, S. M., Mars, R. B., Gladwin, T. E., & Haggard, P. (2009).When the brain changes its
mind: Flexibility of action selection in instructed and free choices. Cerebral Cortex,
19(10), 2352–2360. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cercor/bhn252.
Flowers, J. H. (1990). Priming effects in perceptual classiﬁcation. Perception &
Psychophysics, 47(2), 135–148. http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/BF03205978.
Fritz, J., & Dreisbach, G. (2013). Conﬂicts as aversive signals: Conﬂict priming increases
negative judgments for neutral stimuli. Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral
Neuroscience, 13(2), 311–317. http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13415-012-0147-1.
Gallagher, S. (2012). Multiple aspects in the sense of agency. New Ideas in Psychology,
30(1), 15–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.newideapsych.2010.03.003.
Gratton, G., Coles, M. G., & Donchin, E. (1992). Optimizing the use of information: Strate-
gic control of activation of responses. Journal of Experimental Psychology. General,
121(4), 480–506.
Haggard, P., & Chambon, V. (2012). Sense of agency. Current Biology, 22(10), R390–R392.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2012.02.040.
Haggard, P., & Tsakiris, M. (2009). The experience of agency. Current Directions in
Psychological Science, 18(4), 242–246. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8721.2009.
01644.x.
Haggard, P., Clark, S., & Kalogeras, J. (2002). Voluntary action and conscious awareness.
Nature Neuroscience, 5(4), 382–385. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nn827.
Holroyd, C. B., & Yeung, N. (2012). Motivation of extended behaviors by anterior cingulate
cortex. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 16(2), 122–128. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.
2011.12.008.
Hume, D. (1740). A treatise of human nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Jonides, J., & Mack, R. (1984). On the cost and beneﬁt of cost and beneﬁt. Psychological
Bulletin, 96(1), 29–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.96.1.29.
Kiesel, A., Wagener, A., Kunde, W., Hoffmann, J., Fallgatter, A. J., & Stöcker, C. (2006). Un-
conscious manipulation of free choice in humans. Consciousness and Cognition, 15(2),
397–408. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2005.10.002.
Klapp, S. T., & Haas, B. W. (2005). Nonconscious inﬂuence of masked stimuli on response
selection is limited to concrete stimulus-response associations. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 31(1), 193–209. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1037/0096-1523.31.1.193.
Klapp, S. T., & Hinkley, L. B. (2002). The negative compatibility effect: Unconscious inhibition
inﬂuences reaction time and response selection. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
General, 131(2), 255–269. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0096-3445.131.2.255.
Kleiner, M., Brainard, D. H., & Pelli, D. G. (2007). What's new in psychtoolbox-3?
Perception, 36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1068/v070821 (ECVP abstract supplement).
Kopp, B., Rist, F., & Mattler, U. (1996). N200 in the ﬂanker task as a neurobehavioral tool
for investigating executive control. Psychophysiology, 33(3), 282–294.
Kühn, S., Nenchev, I., Haggard, P., Brass, M., Gallinat, J., & Voss, M. (2011). Whodunnit?
Electrophysiological correlates of agency judgements. PloS One, 6(12), e28657.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0028657.
Loftus, G. R., & Masson, M. E. J. (1994). Using conﬁdence intervals in within-subject de-
signs. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 1(4), 476–490. http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/
BF03210951.
Mansﬁeld, K. L., van der Molen, M.W., Falkenstein, M., & van Boxtel, G. J. M. (2013). Tem-
poral dynamics of interference in Simon and Eriksen tasks considered within the
11N. Sidarus, P. Haggard / Acta Psychologica 166 (2016) 1–11context of a dual-process model. Brain and Cognition, 82(3), 353–363. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1016/j.bandc.2013.06.001.
Matchock, R., & Mordkoff, J. T. (2007). Visual attention, reaction time, and self-reported
alertness upon awakening from sleep bouts of varying lengths - Springer.
Experimental Brain Research, 178, 228–239. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00221-006-
0726-x.
Mattler, U., & Palmer, S. (2012). Time course of free-choice priming effects explained by a
simple accumulator model. Cognition, 123(3), 347–360. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
cognition.2012.03.002.
Metcalfe, J., & Greene, M. J. (2007). Metacognition of agency. Journal of Experimental
Psychology. General, 136(2), 184–199. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0096-3445.136.2.
184.
Moore, J. W., & Fletcher, P. C. (2012). Sense of agency in health and disease: A review of
cue integration approaches. Consciousness and Cognition, 21(1), 59–68. http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2011.08.010.
Morsella, E., Wilson, L. E., Berger, C. C., Honhongva, M., Gazzaley, A., & Bargh, J. A. (2009).
Subjective aspects of cognitive control at different stages of processing. Attention,
Perception & Psychophysics, 71(8), 1807–1824. http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/APP.71.8.
1807.
Nahmias, E. (2005). Agency, authorship, and illusion. Consciousness and Cognition, 14(4),
771–785. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2005.07.002.
O'Connor, P. A., & Neill, W. T. (2011). Does subliminal priming of free response choices de-
pend on task set or automatic response activation? Consciousness and Cognition,
20(2), 280–287. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2010.08.007.
Pacherie, E. (2008). The phenomenology of action: A conceptual framework. Cognition,
107(1), 179–217. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2007.09.003.
Pelli, D. G. (1997). The VideoToolbox software for visual psychophysics: Transforming
numbers into movies. Spatial Vision, 10(4), 437–442.
Pﬁster, R., & Janczyk, M. (2013). Conﬁdence intervals for two sample means: Calculation,
interpretation, and a few simple rules. Advances in Cognitive Psychology, 9(2), 74–80.
http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/v10053-008-0133-x.
Schlaghecken, F., & Eimer, M. (2004). Masked prime stimuli can bias “free” choices be-
tween response alternatives. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 11(3), 463–468. http://
dx.doi.org/10.3758/BF03196596.Sidarus, N., Chambon, V., & Haggard, P. (2013). Priming of actions increases sense of con-
trol over unexpected outcomes. Consciousness and Cognition, 22(4), 1403–1411.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2013.09.008.
Sumner, P., Nachev, P., Morris, P., Peters, A. M., Jackson, S. R., Kennard, C., & Husain, M.
(2007). Human medial frontal cortex mediates unconscious inhibition of voluntary
action. Neuron, 54(5), 697–711. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2007.05.016.
Synofzik, M., Vosgerau, G., & Newen, A. (2008). Beyond the comparator model: A multi-
factorial two-step account of agency. Consciousness and Cognition, 17(1), 219–239.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2007.03.010.
Taylor, D. A. (1977). Time course of context effects. Journal of Experimental Psychology.
General, 106(4), 404–426. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0096-3445.106.4.404.
Rodrı́guez-Fornells, A., Kurzbuch, A. R., & Münte, T. F. (2002). Time course of error detec-
tion and correction in humans: Neurophysiological evidence. The Journal of
Neuroscience, 22(22), 9990–9996.
van Gaal, S., Scholte, H. S., Lamme, V. A. F., Fahrenfort, J. J., & Ridderinkhof, K. R. (2010).
Pre-SMA graymatter density predicts individual differences in action selection in
the face of conscious and unconscious response conﬂict. Journal of Cognitive
Neuroscience, 23(2), 382–390. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jocn.2010.21444.
Wascher, E., Reinhard, M., Wauschkuhn, B., & Verleger, R. (1999). Spatial S-R compatibil-
ity with centrally presented stimuli: An event-related asymmetry study on dimen-
sional overlap. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 11(2), 214–229. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1162/089892999563346.
Wegner, D. M., & Wheatley, T. (1999). Apparent mental causation. Sources of the experi-
ence of will. The American Psychologist, 54(7), 480–492.
Wenke, D., Fleming, S. M., & Haggard, P. (2010). Subliminal priming of actions inﬂuences
sense of control over effects of action. Cognition, 115(1), 26–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.
1016/j.cognition.2009.10.016.
Willemssen, R., Hoormann, J., Hohnsbein, J., & Falkenstein, M. (2004). Central and parietal
event-related lateralizations in a ﬂanker task. Psychophysiology, 41(5), 762–771.
Winkielman, P., Ziembowicz, M., & Nowak, A. (2015). The coherent and ﬂuentmind: How
uniﬁed consciousness is constructed from cross-modal inputs via integrated process-
ing experiences. Consciousness Research, 6, 83. http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.
00083.
